LIMITS ON CONTENT:
source : abiamare
Ethiopian authorities persistently deny engaging in online censorship, but the results of the most recent independent tests conducted by the OpenNet Initiative (ONI) in 2009 and checked again by Freedom House at the end of 2011, indicate otherwise.
Both sets of tests indicated that the Ethiopian government imposes nationwide, politically motivated internet filtering.The blocking of websites is somewhat sporadic, tending to tighten ahead of sensitive political events. This on again, off again dynamic continued in 2011, though there were also indications that the technical sophistication of the government’s blocking had increased and that periods of openness were shrinking.
The government’s approach to internet filtering has generally entailed hindering access to a list of specific
internet protocol (IP) addresses or domain names at the level of the international gateway. One blogger reported in January 2011, however, that since mid-2010, the government had been introducing more sophisticated equipment capable of blocking a webpage based on a keyword in the URL path.
The observable evidence he cited included the blocking of the individual Facebook page of the exiled news outlet Addis Neger, as well as the fact that blocked content could no longer be accessed via Google cache as was previously possible. In July 2011, Ethio Telecom released a tender calling for bids to develop deep-packet inspection (DPI) to be implemented by mid-2012, which would make the existing censorship apparatus more sophisticated.
Testing by ONI found that the filtering focuses primarily on independent online news media, political blogs, and Ethiopian human rights groups’ websites. International news outlets such as the U.S.-based Cable News Network (CNN) and nongovernmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch,
Amnesty International, and Reporters Without Borders—all of which have criticized the Ethiopian government’s human rights record—were available as of early 2009. However, tests conducted by Freedom House found that in 2010 and 2011, the websites of Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International were inaccessible.
Ethiopian websites and blogs that are typically blocked but that suddenly became available in early 2009 included CyberEthiopia, Ethiopian Review, Ethiopian Media Forum, Quatero, and Ethiomedia. Several observers suggested that the loosening came in response to the 2008 U.S.
State Department human rights report on Ethiopia released in February 2009,which accused the government of restricting internet access by blocking politically oriented websites.CyberEthiopia, a prodemocracy website, commented in March 2009 that the erratic nature of internet filtering may be a deliberate tactic by the authorities to create confusion and buttress government claims that there is no systematic or pervasive filtering in the country.
By mid-2010, all newly available websites and several others—including the online version of Addis Neger, a leading independent newspaper that was forced to close in December 2009—were temporarily inaccessible again, apparently as part of the government’s broader election-related restrictions on the free flow of information.
These websites were blocked for much of 2011, but were briefly unblocked in May 2011, coinciding with a UNESCO event for International Press Freedom Day and the release of a report by the Committee to Protect Journalists criticizing internet censorship in Ethiopia; the timing again reflected the government’s possible efforts to loosen online censorship when under international scrutiny, only to impose it again when the spotlight is removed.
By late May, many of the above websites, and some new ones, were blocked again after activists created a Facebook page titled “Beka!” (Enough!) calling for anti-government protests inspired by the Arab Spring uprisings to take place on May 28, 2011. As of early 2012, the above-mentioned websites, as well as those of Ethsat (an independent exile television station) and Dilethiopia (an opposition website) were inaccessible.
Further, an independent test conducted by Freedom House in early 2012 found that 65 websites related to news and views, 14 websites belonging to different Ethiopian political parties, 37 blogs, 7 audio-video websites, and 37 Facebook pages were not accessible in Ethiopia.
In addition to website blocking, some restrictions are also placed on mobile phone text-messaging. In particular, mobile phone users, businesses, and civil society groups are unable to send a message to more than ten recipients without prior approval of its content from Ethio Telecom.
Procedures for determining which websites should be blocked and when are extremely opaque. There is no published list of blocked websites or publicly available criteria for how such decisions are made, and users are met with an error message when trying to access a blocked website.
This lack of transparency is exacerbated by the government’s continued denial of its censorship efforts. The decision-making process does not appear to be centrally controlled. Thus, various governmental entities, along with the Information Network Security Agency (INSA) and Ethio Telecom, seem to be implementing their own lists, contributing to the phenomenon of inconsistent blocking.
The increased repression in 2011 against journalists working in traditional media as well as against a number of bloggers has generated a chilling effect in the online sphere. Few Ethiopian journalists work for both domestic print media and as correspondents for overseas online outlets, as this could draw negative repercussions. Many bloggers publish anonymously to avoid reprisals.
In addition to censorship, the authorities use regime apologists, paid commentators, and pro-government websites to proactively manipulate the online news and information landscape. Acrimonious exchanges between a small number of apologist websites and a wide array of diaspora critics and opposition forces have become common in online political debates.
Lack of adequate funding represents another challenge for independent online media, as fear of government pressure dissuades Ethiopian businesses from advertising with politically critical websites.
Regime critics and opposition forces in the diaspora increasingly use the internet as a platform for political debate and an indirect avenue for providing information to local newspapers. However, given the low internet penetration rate, the domestic Ethiopian blogosphere is still in its infancy.
Blogging initially blossomed during the period surrounding the 2005 parliamentary elections and the subsequent clampdown on independent newspapers. This growth has slowed somewhat since 2007, when the government instituted a blanket block on the domain names of two popular blog-hosting websites,
Blogger and Nazret.com. Some political commentators use proxy servers and anonymizing tools to hide their identities when publishing online and to circumvent filtering. Among general internet users, however, circumvention tools are rarely employed, and most people simply forego accessing websites that are blocked.
Over the past two years, the use of social-networking sites, most notably Facebook, as platforms for political deliberation, social justice campaigns, and information sharing has gained momentum. For example, in March 2012 some activists used social media to launch campaigns on behalf of Ethiopian female domestic workers working in the Middle East who were being abused.
Nevertheless, many civil society groups based in the country are wary of mobilizing against the government. In February 2011, opposition activists launched the Facebook group “Beka!” (Enough!) calling for a “day of rage” and anti-government protests to be held on May 28. The intention was to have a counter demonstration the same day as a government-sponsored rally celebrating the anniversary of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s rule. No protest materialized,
however.This appeared to be because the calls for protest were mostly coming from the Ethiopian diaspora rather than from within the country, as those inside Ethiopia still harbored fear from the bloody crackdown on opposition demonstrations after the 2005 elections and from the most recent round of opposition activist arrests in April 2011 (see “Violations of User Rights”).
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